

THE TYPOLOGY OF THEORIES AND MODELS OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS' FORMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

The article is dedicated to proposing and detailing a wide-ranging typology of theories and models of minority governments' formation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. The researcher singled out theoretical and methodological perspectives of minority governments' investigation and explanation, and proved that theories and models of minority governments should be divided onto empirical and a priori, position-oriented (or «policy-blind») and policy-oriented (or «policy-cognizant»), as well as cooperative and non-cooperative.

Keywords: government, minority government, theory and model of minority government, parliamentary democracy.

ТИПОЛОГІЯ ТЕОРІЙ І МОДЕЛЕЙ ФОРМУВАННЯ ТА ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНОСТІ УРЯДІВ МЕНШОСТІ У ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЯХ

У статті запропоновано і деталізовано різносторонню типологію теорій/моделей формування та відповідальності урядів меншості у парламентських демократіях. Виокремлено теоретико-методологічні перспективи дослідження і пояснення урядів меншості. Виявлено, що теорії і моделі урядів меншості доцільно таксономувати на емпіричні та апіорні, посадо-орієнтовані (або «політико-приховані») та політико-орієнтовані (або «політико-обізнані»), а також кооперативні та некооперативні.

Ключові слова: уряд, уряд меншості, теорії/моделі урядів меншості, парламентська демократія.

Political science testifies that relations, which occur amidst the actions of various parliamentary actors in circumstances where minority governments exist and specificity of implementation of their constitutional functions and duties by minority governments within parliamentary democracies, determine classical and non-classical/modern theoretical perspectives, which are divided into rationalistic, institutional and partological. The first refers to the assumptions of the theories of a rational choice and games, which argue that political actors are rational, and coalitional policy is strategic, as

it manifests itself as a game between parties¹. The second one is defined by the fact that coalitional policy is institutionally presupposed and goes beyond the limits of personal factors, which identify individual players and their behavior, that is why a choice of players is predetermined by a set of standards, regulations, restrictions and conditions of the political system. The third assigns the main part to parties and party systems in the process of formation of interparty dynamics in legislatures. However, pointing out several perspectives in the course of minority government research does not allow to find a unilateral concept towards determination of theories and models of their formation and liability in parliamentary democracies, as in the political science has already been established an extremely diversified approach to classification of such theories and models. Correspondingly, the analysis of the theories and models of minority government formation, as well as their variegated and generalized typology in parliamentary democracies is currently topical and thus is a subject of the present paper.

This range of problems has been partially investigated and described by such scientists as D. Austen-Smith, J. Banks and J. Duggan², D. Baron and J. Ferejohn³, A. Bassi⁴, E. Browne and M. Franklin⁵, C. Crombez⁶, A. De Swaan⁷, D. Diermeier, A. Merlo, H. Eraslan and R. Stevenson⁸, T. Kalandrakis⁹, D. Kreps¹⁰, M. Laver and K. Shepsle¹¹,

¹ Müller W., Ström K., *Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction*, [w:] Müller W., Ström K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 1–31.

² Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes*, "American Political Science Review" 1988, vol 82, nr. 2, s. 405–422.; Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Positive Political Theory II: Strategies and Structures*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 2009.; Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios*, "American Political Science Review" 1990, vol 84, nr. 3, s. 891–906.; Banks J., Duggan J., *A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice*, "American Political Science Review" 2000, vol 84, nr. 1, s. 73–88.; Banks J., *Singularity Theory and Core Existence in the Spatial Model*, "Journal of Mathematical Economics" 1995, vol 24, nr. 6, s. 523–536.

³ Baron D., *A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1989, vol 33, nr. 4, s. 1048–1084.; Baron D., *A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in a Parliamentary System*, "American Political Science Review" 1992, vol 85, nr. 1, s. 137–164.; Baron D., Ferejohn J., *Bargaining in Legislatures*, "The American Political Science Review" 1989, vol 83, nr. 4, s. 1181–1206.; Baron D., *Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments*, "American Political Science Review" 1998, vol 92, nr. 3, s. 593–609.; Baron D., Diermeier D., *Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems*, "Quarterly Journal of Economics" 2001, vol 116, nr. 3, s. 933–967.

⁴ Bassi A., *A Model of Endogenous Government Formation*, "The Review of Financial Studies" 2013, vol 26, nr. 7, s. 1824–1852.

⁵ Browne E., Franklin M., *Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies*, "The American Political Science Review" 1973, vol 67, nr. 2, s. 453–469.

⁶ Crombez C., *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 1, s. 1–29.

⁷ De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier 1973.

⁸ Diermeier D., Merlo A., *An Empirical Investigation of Conditional Bargaining Procedures*, "Journal of Public Economics" 2004, vol 88, nr. 3–4, s. 783–797.; Diermeier D., Eraslan H., Merlo A., *A Structural Model of Government Formation*, "Econometrica" 2003, vol 71, nr. 1, s. 27–70.; Diermeier D., Stevenson R., *Cabinet Survival and Competing Risks*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1999, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 1051–1068.; Diermeier D., Stevenson R., *Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events*, "American Political Science Review" 2000, vol 94, nr. 3, s. 627–640.; Diermeier D., Merlo A., *Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2000, vol 94, nr. 1, s. 46–79.; Merlo A., *Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment*, "Journal of Political Economy" 1997, vol 105, nr. 1, s. 101–131.; Merlo A., Wilson C., *A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information*, "Econometrica" 1995, vol 63, nr. 2, s. 371–399.; Merlo A., Wilson C., *Efficient Delays in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining*, "Economic Theory" 1998, vol 11, nr. 1, s. 39–55.

⁹ Kalandrakis T., *A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments*, "Political Science Research and Methods" 2015, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 309–328.; Kalandrakis T., *A Three-Player Dynamic Majoritarian Bargaining Game*, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2004, vol 116, nr. 2, s. 294–322.; Kalandrakis T., *General Equilibrium Parliamentary Government: PhD thesis*, Wyd. University of California 2000.; Kalandrakis T., *Generic Regularity of Stationary Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games*, "Economic Theory" 2006, vol 28, s. 309–329.; Kalandrakis T., *Minimum Winning Coalitions and Endogenous Status Quo*, "International Journal of Game Theory" 2010, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 617–643.

¹⁰ Kreps D., *Game Theory and Economic Modelling*, Wyd. Clarendon 1990.

¹¹ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Coalitions and Cabinet Government*, "American Political Science Review" 1990, vol 84, nr. 3, s. 873–890.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Events, Equilibria and Government Survival*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1998, vol 42, nr. 1, s. 28–54.; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

M. Laver, M. Taylor and N. Schofield¹², G. Luebbert¹³, L. Martin and R. Stevenson¹⁴, M. Morelli¹⁵, W. Müller and K. Strom¹⁶, W. Riker¹⁷, A. Rubinstein¹⁸, K. Shepsle¹⁹, K. Strom²⁰, G. Tsebelis²¹, P. van Roozendaal²² and others.

In some of the works, in particular M. Laver's²³ "Models of Government Formation", it is argued that theories and models of government formation and liability, especially in case of parliamentary minority, must be classified as empirical and a priori, office-seeking (or "politically-blind") and policy-seeking (politically-cognizant), and cooperative and non-cooperative. Their overlapping let us comprehend reasons, tendencies and peculiarities of formation of governments of different types, in particular minority governments, in the perspective of various rational, partological and institutional factors.

The division of theories and models of governmental cabinet formation into empirical and a priori is based on the parameters of methodological style and logical modeling. Empirical theories study the process of government/governmental cabinet formation and liability as a fundamental subject of their interests. They gather information about the reasons of government formation and/or resignation, analyze them for the purpose of regularity and repetition and on these bases make theoretical conclusions concerning peculiarities of formation and liabilities of different types of governments in the perspective of various characteristics of political systems, as well as taking into account variegated (rational, institutional and partological) perspectives of studying government formation and liabilities. That is why, empirical theories are not focused on constructing individual abstract conclusions, but are concentrated on factual actions and processes of government formation. On the contrary, a priori theories are focused on the assumptions, which in total provide stylized and simplified description of the key peculiarities of formation/liabilities of different types of governments. However, these theories are also grounded on the insights of real politics and thus have a large empirical base. But "at the end" their aim is not to single out factors/attributes of formation and liabilities of different types of

¹² Laver M., Taylor M., *Government coalitions in Western Europe*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1973, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 205–248; Laver M., *Models of Government Formation*, "Annual Review of Political Science" 1998, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 1–25; Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998; Schofield N., *Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 1–33.

¹³ Luebbert G., *Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

¹⁴ Martin L., Stevenson R., *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 33–50.

¹⁵ Morelli M., *Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining*, "American Political Science Review" 1999, vol 93, nr. 4, s. 809–820.

¹⁶ Müller W., Strom K., *Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction*, [w:] Müller W., Strom K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 1–31; Müller W., Strom K., *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.

¹⁷ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

¹⁸ Rubinstein A., *Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model*, "Econometrica" 1982, vol 50, nr. 1, s. 97–109.

¹⁹ Shepsle K., *Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1979, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 27–60.

²⁰ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

²¹ Tsebelis G., Ha E., *Coalition Theory: A Veto Players Approach*, "European Political Science Review" 2014, vol 6, nr. 3, s. 331–357; Tsebelis G., *Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1995, vol 25, nr. 3, s. 289–325; Tsebelis G., *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2002.

²² van Roozendaal P., *The effect of central and dominant parties on cabinet composition and durability*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1992, vol 17, nr. 1, s. 5–35.

²³ Laver M., *Models of Government Formation*, "Annual Review of Political Science" 1998, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 1–25.

governments within variant systems, but construction of clear models of government-formation process, based on feasible “starting” assumptions and strict logical arguments. Therefore, a priori theories are more intuitive than empirical²⁴.

The division of theories and models of governmental cabinet formation into office-seeking (or “politically-blind”) and policy-seeking (politically-cognizant) is based on taking into account motivational assumptions of blocs, parties and deputies that participate in government-formation process within parliamentary democracies. Politicians, first of all, may be motivated by the desire to get into governments/governmental cabinets or the wish to actualize their political goals, both by means of governmental cabinets and without them²⁵. Besides, parties and politicians may be motivated by the desire to get into governments/governmental cabinets and some other wishes. They (these aims) usually are scientifically disordered and unstructured²⁶. For example, a party or politician may combine office-seeking and policy-seeking motives of their activity. It significantly burdens theoretical constructions of government formation and liabilities within parliamentary democracies. Especially, it is in the perspective of electoral preferences, which are accumulated in parties’ and politicians’ motives²⁷. From this point of view, it is notable that earlier theories of government formation and liability were office-seeking, whereas later (current) – are policy-seeking. However, it does not mean that factually and empirically governmental cabinets nowadays have become predominantly policy-seeking.

Finally, the division of theories and models of government/governmental cabinet formation and liabilities into cooperative and non-cooperative (generally this division refers to the a priori theories of government formation) is based on the fact that to some extent the very process of government formation and providing it with parliamentary vote of confidence within parliamentary democracy is a “game”. And “games”, in their turn, are theoretically divided into cooperative and non-cooperative²⁸, what is important from the perspective of government formation, especially coalitional ones, as different parties take control over different governmental positions and ministerial posts²⁹. The cooperative approach considers “governmental victories” of parties in case of different variants on the basis of the assumption that the most “valuable” is that variant of governmental cabinet, which will more than likely be actualized/formed. Correspondingly, the approach focuses on determining each variant of governmental cabinet in accordance with current institutions and institutional rules of the game and a “victory” of any political actor is defined as a kind of function of “values” of different variants of governmental cabinets, in which this political actor may participate and in correspondence to which it may conduct negotiations as to specified rules of a game. On the contrary, the non-cooperative approach interprets actors’ behavior in the frames of hypothetical governmental cabinets, despite the fact whether such actors are blocs, parties,

²⁴ Laver M., *Models of Government Formation*, “Annual Review of Political Science” 1998, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 2–3.

²⁵ Müller W., Strøm K., *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*, Cambridge 1999.

²⁶ Laver M., *Models of Government Formation*, “Annual Review of Political Science” 1998, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 5.

²⁷ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998, s. 45–60.

²⁸ Kreps D., *Game Theory and Economic Modelling*, Wyd. Clarendon 1990, s. 9.

²⁹ Laver M., *Models of Government Formation*, “Annual Review of Political Science” 1998, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 4.

parts of parties (factions), individual deputies. The approach is concentrated on constructing balanced governmental cabinet, i.e. a cabinet which is preferred to other alternative governmental cabinets by all its members. Correspondingly, the approach is focused on achieving such government-formation process, which is aimed at achieving interparty balance, i.e. best possible individual strategy of each member of a governmental cabinet. It is notable, that evolutionally cooperative theories of government formation and liabilities have been corresponding to the rational and partological perspectives, whereas non-cooperative theories – to the institutionalized perspective. It is presupposed by the fact that governmental cabinet formation and liabilities are “products” of the institutional rules of government-formation process, in particular referring to such issues as consequence of engaging leaders or representatives of various parties to the process of government formation, peculiarities and procedures of votes of confidence/investiture in governments on the part of parliaments or leading chambers of parliaments, characteristics of division of certain political jurisdiction and ministerial posts (“governmental victories”).

Extrapolating given typology of theories and models of government formation on the cases of minority cabinets, M. Laver argues that they are best described by the theories of government formation, which are a priori and policy-seeking, especially in the frames of cooperative approach³⁰. It becomes obvious from the analytical facts provided by the political science in the 70s-80s of the 20th century, which state, in particular by E. Browne³¹, A. De Swaan³², M. Taylor and M. Laver³³, that minimally victorious coalitions are not so widespread, as it is predetermined by a priori theories of government formation. On the contrary, a large part of post-war governments within parliamentary democracies in Europe, for instance, was composed of minority cabinets, which in no way works with office-seeking theories of government formation³⁴ (however L. Martin and R. Stevenson³⁵ proved that in European parliamentary democracies, except minority cabinets, the same crucial role is played by both office-seeking seeking (or “politically-blind”) and policy-seeking (politically-cognizant) theories of governmental cabinet formation.

That is why, M. Laver focuses on two factors that explain minority government formation in parliamentary democracies, defined by K. Strom and G. Luebbert, and which are dependable on the role of party policy in the government formation processes³⁶. In particular, G. Luebbert³⁷ describes government formation by means of interparty relation and roles of party leaders. Interpreting party leaders as people who are fundamentally motivated by a desire to stay in their leadership positions, the scientist defines party policy as a means of manipulation on behalf of

³⁰ Laver M., *Models of Government Formation*, “Annual Review of Political Science” 1998, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 13.

³¹ Browne E., Franklin M., *Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies*, “The American Political Science Review” 1973, vol 67, nr. 2, s. 453–469.

³² De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier 1973.

³³ Laver M., Taylor M., *Government coalitions in Western Europe*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1973, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 205–248.

³⁴ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

³⁵ Martin L., Stevenson R., *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, “American Journal of Political Science” 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 41.

³⁶ Laver M., *Models of Government Formation*, “Annual Review of Political Science” 1998, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 14.

³⁷ Luebbert G., *Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

party leaders in order to achieve their motivation. Correspondingly, G. Luebbert's explanation is presupposed by the fact that some party leaders who see a chance to become members of governmental cabinets may be afraid of the consequences, which can threaten their leadership potential in the parties. On the contrary, K. Strom³⁸ explaining the phenomenon and peculiarities of minority government formation interprets the game not only as a government-formation process, but electoral and legislative processes as well. He remarks that membership in party cabinets has both drawbacks and benefits. A great part of drawbacks is represented by restriction of a party's electoral chances, in particular after finding compromises with other parties which are electoral competitors/rivals. Therefore, parties quite often choose a strategy to stay oppositional/non-governmental, especially if they anticipate electoral losses while forming or being a part of governments³⁹. It is supplemented by systems committees and commissions, powerful as to their authorities, which exist in some parliamentary democracies and result in high frequency of minority governments.

Theoretical-methodological conclusion that minority governments are predominantly formed in accordance with the patterns of a priori policy-seeking theories is also supported by N. Schofield, who states that if in a party system any centrist/core party exists, then it strives to create single-party minority government as a result of government-formation processes⁴⁰. The point is that in such case "an ideal place" for such party will be governmental policy. If such party does not exist in the party system, then the result of a government-formation process will usually be minimally victorious coalition. And if this conclusion is interpreted in the frames of a non-cooperative approach, it becomes quite obvious that in case of centrist/core party, which can form single-party minority government, any governmental cabinet must comprise such party in its structure. In other case such party will have an opportunity and potential to veto any alternative cabinet and by this prevent its formation. As explained by M. Laver and K. Shepsle⁴¹, L. Martin and R. Stevenson⁴², it means that if in the system there is a strong centrist party (sometimes it should not be obligatory centrist), then it becomes a member of any or almost any government, based on the principle of balance. Thus, it is a member of coalitional or single-party minority government or coalitional majority government.

To the great extent the abovementioned problem is described by K. Crombez⁴³ and P. Van Roozendaal⁴⁴, who reasonably state that an increase in frequency of minority government formation is contributed by enlargement of size and centrist-ideological positions of

³⁸ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

³⁹ Mershon C., *The costs of coalition: coalition theories and Italian governments*, "American Political Science Review" 1996, vol 90, nr. 3, s. 534–554.

⁴⁰ Schofield N., *Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 8.

⁴¹ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

⁴² Martin L., Stevenson R., *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 33–50.

⁴³ Crombez C., *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 1, s. 1–29.

⁴⁴ van Roozendaal P., *The effect of central and dominant parties on cabinet composition and durability*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1992, vol 17, nr. 1, s. 5–35.

parliamentary parties and leading chambers of parliaments. On the contrary, G. Tsebelis argues that in case a powerful centrist party does not form a minority government, then on the basis of influence it has on the political agenda it achieves other political results, which are close to the anticipated position⁴⁵. M. Taylor and M. Laver put it more generally: if in a party system there is a parliamentary party with an “almost absolute” majority of seats in the parliament or the leading chamber of the parliament and it enjoys support of another/other parliamentary parties or leading chambers of parliament, then it must be treated as the most significant “independent” explanation for minority government formation within parliamentary democracies⁴⁶. This explanation is determined by parliamentary support or “critical restraint” of other parties in the process of gaining votes of confidence/investiture on the part of parliaments or leading chambers of parliaments, as well as in the course of minority governmental cabinets’ functioning.

First non-cooperative theories of minority government formation in the political science arose in the late 80s – early 90s of the 20th century. They are related to such scholars as D. Austen-Smith, J. Banks⁴⁷, D. Baron, J. Ferejohn⁴⁸ and M. Morelli⁴⁹. But despite this they apply bases of classical theories and models of a rational choice, in which it is postulated (on the grounds of W. Riker’s idea of the “size principle”⁵⁰), that: the division of ministerial posts must be modeled as a clear component of agreement as to government formation; the advantage of a political party for any policy, conducted by a governmental cabinet, grows with the increase of its part of governmental or cabinet posts; government-formation process is rationalized in case of avoiding sizing sequence and other a priori restrictions, which may overlap with an anticipated agreement, which is the subject to the negotiations between the political parties. In such case scientists who support non-cooperative approach raise a question whether minority governmental cabinets can achieve balance under conditions of the above-mentioned characteristics of a rational choice⁵¹, and almost always give a positive answer to the question. The point is that according to non-cooperative theories minority governmental cabinets are predominantly formed when political divergences or political polarization between parties, which participate in negotiations, are relative as to the significance and usefulness of their participation in a governmental cabinet. Besides, researchers

⁴⁵ Tsebelis G., Ha E., *Coalition Theory: A Veto Players Approach*, “European Political Science Review” 2014, vol 6, nr. 3, s. 331–357.; Tsebelis G., *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2002.

⁴⁶ Laver M., Taylor M., *Government coalitions in Western Europe*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1973, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 232.

⁴⁷ Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes*, “American Political Science Review” 1988, vol 82, nr. 2, s. 405–422.; Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Positive Political Theory II: Strategies and Structures*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 2009.; Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios*, “American Political Science Review” 1990, vol 84, nr. 3, s. 891–906.; Banks J., Duggan J., *A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice*, “American Political Science Review” 2000, vol 84, nr. 1, s. 73–88.; Banks J., *Singularity Theory and Core Existence in the Spatial Model*, “Journal of Mathematical Economics” 1995, vol 24, nr. 6, s. 523–536.

⁴⁸ Baron D., *A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions*, “American Journal of Political Science” 1989, vol 33, nr. 4, s. 1048–1084.; Baron D., *A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in a Parliamentary System*, “American Political Science Review” 1992, vol 85, nr. 1, s. 137–164.; Baron D., Ferejohn J., *Bargaining in Legislatures*, “The American Political Science Review” 1989, vol 83, nr. 4, s. 1181–1206.; Baron D., *Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments*, “American Political Science Review” 1998, vol 92, nr. 3, s. 593–609.; Baron D., Diermeier D., *Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems*, “Quarterly Journal of Economics” 2001, vol 116, nr. 3, s. 933–967.

⁴⁹ Morelli M., *Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining*, “American Political Science Review” 1999, vol 93, nr. 4, s. 809–820.

⁵⁰ Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

⁵¹ Kalandrakis T., *A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments*, “Political Science Research and Methods” 2015, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 309–328.

state that minority governments appear when a party-originator possesses the position of power with regard to its coalitional partners. However, it also means that the party-originator may gain parliamentary support from beyond the governmental cabinet form formally oppositional parties in return of implementation of their political programs. It largely proves the conclusions provided by K. Strom⁵² and G. Tsebelis⁵³ within the frames of cooperative models/theories of government formation that minority governments may be stable and sustainable political decisions.

But the conclusions as to the peculiarities of minority governmental cabinet formation and liabilities within parliamentary democracies within the frames of non-cooperative theories are different. For instance, according to the model of consecutive negotiation games proposed by A. Rubinstein⁵⁴, which in the political science was approved by D. Baron and J. Ferejohn⁵⁵ and applied in the form of a game “divide the dollar”, minority governments are not formed in the case when we interpret “division of the dollar” as division of ministerial posts. D. Baron, in the so-called “dynamic model” with occasional exogenous status-quo, states that originators prefer minority governments; however the latter do not guarantee balance. On the contrary, T. Kalandrakis⁵⁶ accepts comparability of a division of posts within single-party governments with a game “divide the dollar” if the status quo is endogenic. As a result the scientist remarks⁵⁷, that minority government in different parliamentary democracies are formed with positive anticipation, if parliamentary parties or leading chambers of parliaments are quite ideologically polarizable. And various majority governments, on the contrary, are formed in case of no considerable divergences. Similar conclusions were drawn by K. Crombez⁵⁸ and S.-J. Cho⁵⁹, as well as B. Moselle, B. Jackson⁶⁰ and A. Bassi⁶¹. Their studies show that in the frames of “non-cooperative games” minority governments are formed with due account for two goals – formation and getting posts in the governmental cabinet and actualization of political aims, benefits, preferences. In particular A. Bassi⁶² argues that minority government cabinets make balance and are formed in case when party benefits concerning ministerial posts and political

⁵² Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

⁵³ Tsebelis G., *Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism*, “British Journal of Political Science” 1995, vol 25, nr. 3, s. 289–325.

⁵⁴ Rubinstein A., *Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model*, “Econometrica” 1982, vol 50, nr. 1, s. 97–109.

⁵⁵ Baron D., Ferejohn J., *Bargaining in Legislatures*, “The American Political Science Review” 1989, vol 83, nr. 4, s. 1181–1206.

⁵⁶ Kalandrakis T., *A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments*, “Political Science Research and Methods” 2015, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 309–328; Kalandrakis T., *A Three-Player Dynamic Majoritarian Bargaining Game*, “Journal of Economic Theory” 2004, vol 116, nr. 2, s. 294–322; Kalandrakis T., *General Equilibrium Parliamentary Government: PhD thesis*, Wyd. University of California 2000; Kalandrakis T., *Generic Regularity of Stationary Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games*, “Economic Theory” 2006, vol 28, s. 309–329; Kalandrakis T., *Minimum Winning Coalitions and Endogenous Status Quo*, “International Journal of Game Theory” 2010, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 617–643.

⁵⁷ Kalandrakis T., *A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments*, “Political Science Research and Methods” 2015, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 309–328

⁵⁸ Crombez C., *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1996, vol 29, nr. 1, s. 1–29.

⁵⁹ Cho S.-J., *A dynamic Model of Parliamentary Democracy*, “Economic Theory” 2012, vol 49, nr. 3, s. 703–738.

⁶⁰ Jackson M., Moselle B., *Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game*, “Journal of Economic Theory” 2002, vol 103, nr. 1, s. 49–87.

⁶¹ Bassi A., *A Model of Endogenous Government Formation*, “The Review of Financial Studies” 2013, vol 26, nr. 7, s. 1824–1852.

⁶² Bassi A., *A Model of Endogenous Government Formation*, “The Review of Financial Studies” 2013, vol 26, nr. 7, s. 1824–1852.

course are not equalled and parties due to the high ideological polarization of party systems are not traditional partners in governmental cabinets.

Applying the model of non-cooperative decisions M. Laver and N. Schofield⁶³, M.M. Laver and K. Shepsle⁶⁴, D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks⁶⁵ assume that political parties take care only of implementation of their political goals (they are policy-seeking), and thus ministerial posts are not “governmental victories”. It means that in such case minority governments are formed only when political courses (policy) offered by them are “invincible” and “foundational” for governmental and non-governmental parliamentary parties. Similar position proves G. Tsebelis, who, in the perspective of the “veto-players” theory in the process of governmental cabinet formation processes argues that political positions, benefits and preferences of political/parliamentary parties play a crucial and significant role in government-formation process, as the governmental cabinets themselves in parliamentary democracies control the procedure of elaboration and implementation of policy⁶⁶. Correspondingly, the institutions which regulate this process have impact on governmental cabinet formation. In particular, positional-preferential benefits, which may have a governmental cabinet (for instance centrist ideological and political positioning of originator and its party, negligible ideological distance between parties), become more important due to reduction of institutional conditions and benefits of the agenda concerning elaboration and implementation of policy within such governmental cabinet. And this means that minority governmental cabinets are formed when it to the most extent corresponds with the political course of parties (both governmental and non-governmental), which can provide cabinet with parliamentary support.

Another non-cooperative model of minority government formation was offered by D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, A. Merlo and C. Wilson. The scientists, taking into account division of ministerial posts, state that the party, which supports minority governmental cabinet during “critical” parliamentary voting, but does not get any governmental posts, is not a part of a governmental cabinet (minority), but is a part of a supporting coalition. The point is that government-formation negotiations, which include parties without ministerial posts (“benefits”), carry little

⁶³ Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.

⁶⁴ Laver M., Shepsle K., *Coalitions and Cabinet Government*, “American Political Science Review” 1990, vol 84, nr. 3, s. 873–890; Laver M., Shepsle K., *Events, Equilibria and Government Survival*, “American Journal of Political Science” 1998, vol 42, nr. 1, s. 28–54; Shepsle K., *Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models*, “American Journal of Political Science” 1979, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 27–60.

⁶⁵ Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes*, “American Political Science Review” 1988, vol 82, nr. 2, s. 405–422; Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Positive Political Theory II: Strategies and Structures*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 2009; Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios*, “American Political Science Review” 1990, vol 84, nr. 3, s. 891–906; Banks J., Duggan J., *A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice*, “American Political Science Review” 2000, vol 84, nr. 1, s. 73–88; Banks J., *Singularity Theory and Core Existence in the Spatial Model*, “Journal of Mathematical Economics” 1995, vol 24, nr. 6, s. 523–536.

⁶⁶ Tsebelis G., Ha E., *Coalition Theory: A Veto Players Approach*, “European Political Science Review” 2014, vol 6, nr. 3, s. 331–357.

credibility⁶⁷. And, thus, impossibility to conduct reliable negotiations with non-government parties, concerning actualization of governmental cabinet's course, is a key characteristic in the process of formation, functioning and "survival"/stability of minority governments. Especially, from the point of view that governmental cabinets divide among parliamentary parties not only ministerial posts, but also places in various consultative bodies and civic councils. It makes D. Diermeier and A. Merlo conclude that minority governments (as well as excessive victorious coalitions) may be balanced phenomena⁶⁸. Besides, minority governmental cabinets should not be evaluated as rare and anomalous exceptions, because they may be formed under any circumstances and all factors and characteristics of political systems. By this it becomes obvious that structurally-non-cooperative model of minority governmental cabinet formation refutes the previous conclusion made by K. Strom that minority governments are exceptions, which require explanation⁶⁹. The point is that the originator may choose among several "sustainable" variants of governmental cabinets, which hypothetically should show the best results. But if we take into account all other benefits/preferences it is clear that the originator and its party will get benefits from the policy of compromise, as a result of which the originator will engage as many parliamentary parties as possible. Of course, this corresponds to formation of excessive-victorious coalition. However, if compromises between parties are "too expensive" for the originator, it will conform to the scenario of minority government formation. That is why, D. Diermeier and A. Merlo believe that minimally victorious coalitions are formed exclusively due to dynamic anticipations⁷⁰.

Concluding various generally theoretical peculiarities and models of minority government formation and liabilities we argue that current models of minority government formation (both single party and coalitional) are less predicted as to the fact how minority governments are formed. Besides, present theories cannot fully anticipate which minority governments may be formed. And this means that it is necessary to speak clearly of minority governments' peculiarities of formation and liability, taking into account rational, partological and constitutionally-institutional patterns, as well as to appeal to different theories and models of formation and liabilities of governments.

⁶⁷ Diermeier D., Merlo A., *An Empirical Investigation of Conditional Bargaining Procedures*, "Journal of Public Economics" 2004, vol 88, nr. 3–4, s. 783–797.; Diermeier D., Eraslan H., Merlo A., *A Structural Model of Government Formation*, "Econometrica" 2003, vol 71, nr. 1, s. 27–70.; Diermeier D., Stevenson R., *Cabinet Survival and Competing Risks*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1999, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 1051–1068.; Diermeier D., Stevenson R., *Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events*, "American Political Science Review" 2000, vol 94, nr. 3, s. 627–640.; Diermeier D., Merlo A., *Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2000, vol 94, nr. 1, s. 46–79.; Merlo A., *Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment*, "Journal of Political Economy" 1997, vol 105, nr. 1, s. 101–131.; Merlo A., Wilson C., *A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information*, "Econometrica" 1995, vol 63, nr. 2, s. 371–399.; Merlo A., Wilson C., *Efficient Delays in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining*, "Economic Theory" 1998, vol 11, nr. 1, s. 39–55.

⁶⁸ Diermeier D., Merlo A., *An Empirical Investigation of Conditional Bargaining Procedures*, "Journal of Public Economics" 2004, vol 88, nr. 3–4, s. 783–797.; Diermeier D., Merlo A., *Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2000, vol 94, nr. 1, s. 46–79.

⁶⁹ Strom K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

⁷⁰ Diermeier D., Merlo A., *Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2000, vol 94, nr. 1, s. 46–79.

References

1. Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes*, "American Political Science Review" 1988, vol 82, nr. 2, s. 405–422.
2. Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Positive Political Theory II: Strategies and Structures*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 2009.
3. Austen-Smith D., Banks J., *Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios*, "American Political Science Review" 1990, vol 84, nr. 3, s. 891–906.
4. Banks J., *Singularity Theory and Core Existence in the Spatial Model*, "Journal of Mathematical Economics" 1995, vol 24, nr. 6, s. 523–536.
5. Banks J., Duggan J., *A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice*, "American Political Science Review" 2000, vol 84, nr. 1, s. 73–88.
6. Baron D., *A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1989, vol 33, nr. 4, s. 1048–1084.
7. Baron D., *A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in a Parliamentary System*, "American Political Science Review" 1992, vol 85, nr. 1, s. 137–164.
8. Baron D., *Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments*, "American Political Science Review" 1998, vol 92, nr. 3, s. 593–609.
9. Baron D., Diermeier D., *Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems*, "Quarterly Journal of Economics" 2001, vol 116, nr. 3, s. 933–967.
10. Baron D., Ferejohn J., *Bargaining in Legislatures*, "The American Political Science Review" 1989, vol 83, nr. 4, s. 1181–1206.
11. Bassi A., *A Model of Endogenous Government Formation*, "The Review of Financial Studies" 2013, vol 26, nr. 7, s. 1824–1852.
12. Browne E., Franklin M., *Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies*, "The American Political Science Review" 1973, vol 67, nr. 2, s. 453–469.
13. Cho S.-J., *A dynamic Model of Parliamentary Democracy*, "Economic Theory" 2012, vol 49, nr. 3, s. 703–738.
14. Crombez C., *Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 1, s. 1–29.
15. De Swaan A., *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918*, Wyd. Elsevier 1973.
16. Diermeier D., Eraslan H., Merlo A., *A Structural Model of Government Formation*, "Econometrica" 2003, vol 71, nr. 1, s. 27–70.
17. Diermeier D., Merlo A., *An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures*, "Journal of Public Economics" 2004, vol 88, nr. 3–4, s. 783–797.
18. Diermeier D., Merlo A., *Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies*, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2000, vol 94, nr. 1, s. 46–79.

19. Diermeier D., Stevenson R., *Cabinet Survival and Competing Risks*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1999, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 1051–1068.
20. Diermeier D., Stevenson R., *Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events*, "American Political Science Review" 2000, vol 94, nr. 3, s. 627–640.
21. Jackson M., Moselle B., *Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game*, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2002, vol 103, nr. 1, s. 49–87.
22. Kalandrakis T., *A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments*, "Political Science Research and Methods" 2015, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 309–328.
23. Kalandrakis T., *A Three-Player Dynamic Majoritarian Bargaining Game*, "Journal of Economic Theory" 2004, vol 116, nr. 2, s. 294–322.
24. Kalandrakis T., *General Equilibrium Parliamentary Government: PhD thesis*, Wyd. University of California 2000.
25. Kalandrakis T., *Generic Regularity of Stationary Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games*, "Economic Theory" 2006, vol 28, s. 309–329.
26. Kalandrakis T., *Minimum Winning Coalitions and Endogenous Status Quo*, "International Journal of Game Theory" 2010, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 617–643.
27. Kreps D., *Game Theory and Economic Modelling*, Wyd. Clarendon 1990.
28. Laver M., *Models of Government Formation*, "Annual Review of Political Science" 1998, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 1–25.
29. Laver M., Schofield N., *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.
30. Laver M., Shepsle K., *Coalitions and Cabinet Government*, "American Political Science Review" 1990., vol 84, nr. 3, s. 873–890.
31. Laver M., Shepsle K., *Events, Equilibria and Government Survival*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1998, vol 42, nr. 1, s. 28–54.
32. Laver M., Taylor M., *Government coalitions in Western Europe*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1973, vol 1, nr. 2, s. 205–248.
33. Laver M., Shepsle K., *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.
34. Luebbert G., *Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.
35. Martin L., Stevenson R., *Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 33–50.
36. Merlo A., *Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment*, "Journal of Political Economy" 1997, vol 105, nr. 1, s. 101–131.
37. Merlo A., Wilson C., *A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information*, "Econometrica" 1995, vol 63, nr. 2, s. 371–399.
38. Merlo A., Wilson C., *Efficient Delays in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining*, "Economic Theory" 1998, vol 11, nr. 1, s. 39–55.

39. Mershon C., *The costs of coalition: coalition theories and Italian governments*, "American Political Science Review" 1996, vol 90, nr. 3, s. 534–554.
40. Morelli M., *Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining*, "American Political Science Review" 1999, vol 93, nr. 4, s. 809–820.
41. Müller W., Strøm K., *Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction*, [w:] Müller W., Strøm K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 1–31.
42. Müller W., Strøm K., *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.
43. Riker W., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.
44. Rubinstein A., *Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model*, "Econometrica" 1982, vol 50, nr. 1, s. 97–109.
45. Schofield N., *Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 1–33.
46. Shepsle K., *Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1979, vol 23, nr. 1, s. 27–60.
47. Strøm K., *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.
48. Tsebelis G., *Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism*, "British Journal of Political Science" 1995, vol 25, nr. 3, s. 289–325.
49. Tsebelis G., *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2002.
50. Tsebelis G., Ha E., *Coalition Theory: A Veto Players Approach*, "European Political Science Review" 2014, vol 6, nr. 3, s. 331–357.
51. van Roozendaal P., *The effect of central and dominant parties on cabinet composition and durability*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly" 1992, vol 17, nr. 1, s. 5–35.